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A WORD ABOUT STARE DECISIS.
In recent centuries, we are familiar with two sets of
functionaries, who are concerned in the making of what we
term laws or law. These are parliament or legislature, and
courts of judicature. Until a comparatively short time ago,
the meetings of parliament in England were very few.
Long intervals separated them, and the yield of laws, in any
session, was extremely scanty.
But, in the ages during which there were no, or very few
parliaments, courts were in action. In the absence of principles of decision furnished ab extra, they elaborated their
own.
They adjudged men guilty of crimes, which had not previously been so defined, and sentenced them to penalties
which had not been prescribed. Certain acts, or groups of
acts were called by some Judge treason, murder, robbery,
and he imposed the penalty of death for the doing of them.
In recent times, when the principle antipathetic to ex post
facto laws is spoken of with respect we wonder at the fact
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that our criminal law was born in the ex post facto legislation
of judges and other executive officers.
Similarly many laws, non-criminal in complexion, were
invented by judges. Blackstone remarks: "As to general
customs, or the common law, properly so called, this is
that law by which proceedings and determinations in the
king's ordinary Courts of justice are guided and decided.
This, for the most part, settles the course in which lands
descend by inheritance, the manner and form of acquiring and
transferring property, the solemnities and obligation of contracts, the rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament, the respective remedies of civil injuries, the several
species of temporal offenses, with the manner and degree
of punishment, and an infinite number of minuter particulars
which diffuse themselves as extensively as the ordinary distributions of common justice requires. Thus, for example,
that there shall be four superior courts of record, the chancery, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas and the Exchequer, that the eldest son alone is heir to his ancestor; that
property may be acquired and transferred by writing; that
deed is of no validity unless sealed and delivered; that wills
shall be construed more favorably and deeds more strictly;
that money lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt;
that breaking the public peace is an offence, and punishable
by fine and imprisonment;-all these are doctrines that were
not set down in any written statutes or ordinances, but depend merely upon immemorial usage, that is, upon common law, for their support." 1 Blackstone, Comm. p 68.
It is evident that if Judge A. in one case decided that
one who killed a human being was a murderer, and that he
should be put to death, it was still conceivable that in another case similar in content, he would make a different decision. Still easier would it be to imagine that another
Judge, B. would define homicide differently and impose on
it a different penalty. The formation of a settled rule, in
the absence of so-called legislation, would depend on the propensity of the judges to repeat their own decisions in similar
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cases, and to decide in harmony with the judgments of their
antecessors.
What led to this consentaneousness? Conceivably the
considerations which operated on the mind of the judge and
induced his decision, led to a similar result in a later similar case, before the same judge or another. Identity of
adjudication was not the thing aimed at. The facts were
alike. They operated in a like way on the mind. The mind
reacted towards them, in a like fashion. What we have in
such a case, is not an application of the precept stare decisis,
but a psychological likeness in the judges, responding, in like
ways to like influences.
At times, the author of a decision may, among jurists
contemporary or successive, have an ascendency, owing to
unusual learning, or logical power, or will. He is deferred to
by others, not from any desire to produce a series of harmonious iudgments, but from a wish to do, as he has
done, to think as he has thought, from an unwillingness to
be detected in deviating from the example that he has set.
In all trades and professions, a few get to be acknowledged as
masters, and members of the common herd find satisfaction in taking cover under authority. That eminent men
have been greatly deferred to, is the sign not of an anxiety
to secure unity of decision, for the benefit of the state, but
of a timorousness or reverence based, not on the intrinsic
merits of the paragons but on the felt inferiority of their
imitators.
Occasionally, the justification of adherence by the later
judge, to the decisions of the earlier, is found in the laborsaving resulting from that process. To other reasons for
following the earlier decisions, says Justice Cardozo, "I may
add that the labor of judges would be increased almost to
the breaking point, if every past decision could be reopened
in every case and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
who has gone before him." The Nature of the Judicial Process p. 149. The judges have so many cases to decide that
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they are induced to lessen their labor, by taking, wholesale,
the fruits of the reflections of proceding judges. The extent
to which this motive operates would be determined by the
capacity for work, and willingness to undergo it of the imitating judges.
The state is a person which exists through decades and
centuries. One of its tasks is to produce certain results,
when certain events occur. The events may be human conduct. A. and B. make a contract, and B. does something in
consequence. B. may claim that A should now do something, e. g. pay a sum of money. The state, through its
judge, may think that A should pay it. When a similar contract occurs between C and D, and D. in consequence does an
act like that of B, another judge may think that there should
be application of the same principle, to the two cases, and, to
secure this uniformity, he may purposely decide in the same
way, not because he thinks this way the best, but because
he thinks consistency of decision is more valuable to the
public, than so much of an improvement of the decision as
could be secured by a divagation from the earlier decision.
The principle that the organs of the state, the courts, should
make their judgments conform to earlier judgments in like
cases, is born. It is the duty of the judges stare decisis,
to make their judgments accord with earlier judgments in
like cases.
But, a survey of the decisions, sometimes presents us
with some that are illogical, inconvenient and unjust, so
much so indeed, as to make a self-respecting judge of competent abilities unable to imitate them. Blackstone qualifies
the duty of the judges to follow precedent by the remark;
"The doctrine of the law then is that precedents and rules
must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust." Comm p
70 and he concedes "that the law and the opinion of the judges
are not always convertible terms, or one and the same
thing, since it sometimes may happen that the judge may
mistake the law."
That the decision must be "flatly absurd and unjust"
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before it may be rejected as a precedent, scarcely expresses
the sentiment of some of the judges of Pennsylvania.
A man standing on the platform of a railroad, was
struck and killed, by a passing train. The platform was
too narrow for safety of the passengers. In an action by his
widow, for his death, it was shown that the agent of the R.
R. Company, immediately after the accident telegraphed to
the General Superintendent, the situation of the platform,
and stated that it ought to be removed. It was removed the
next day. This evidence said the court was "clearly proper"
Penn'a R. R. vs. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315. An effort to minimize the force of this decision is made by Fell J. in Baran
v. Reading Iron Co. 202 Pa. 274 who disputes the principle
that an alteration in the structure of the railroad made immediately after, and because of, the accident, may be treated by the jury as an admission that the arrangement superseded was not a proper one.
In Westchester R. R. Co. v. McElwee 67 Pa. 311, a son
was killed by a collision between cars moving along the track,
and a cart, which was on scales for the purpose of being weighed. The trial court, in an action by the parents of the deceased,
allowed proof that since the accident the track had been moved. This was found to be correct by Williams J. who remarked:
"If it tended to show, as suggested, that the tracks were originally too near the office and shanty to permit the cars
to be run on it without danger, then it was evidence of a
fact proper for the consideration of the jury, in determining
whether due and reasonable care had been used by the Company to avoid the accident. If the proximity of the track
to the buildings did not increase the danger, why was it
moved? And if it did, then a higher degree of care was
necessary in order to avoid accident, and in this aspect, the
evidence was properly received." Fell J. in 202 Pa. 274,
supra, disposes of this case by saying that "the negligence
of the defendant was so manifest that proof of subsequent
alterations could not make it more apparent;" and therefore
no harm had been done by the admission of the evidence.
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In McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 218, McKee sought damages
for injury from falling into a hole in a passage way leading
to an office where he had business, there being no light to
reveal the hole. He offered to show that immediately after
the accident, defendant put a gas light close to the opening.
The offer was rejected. A judgment for the defendant was
reversed, Mereur J. saying: "Upon the question of the defendant's negligence, we think the evidence covered by the
first assignment of error (that concerning the placing of
the gas light after accident) will be admissible," and he
cites 51 Pa. 315, supra, and 67 Pa. 311 supra. Fell J. dismisses
this case by the obesrvation that "the reversal was on the
ground that the question of the plaintiff's negligence should
have been submitted to the jury." So it was, but it was held
that, in weighing this question, the putting of the light, immediately after the accident, was a proper fact to consider.
In Lederman v. Penn'a R. R. 165 Pa. 518 a child was
killed in crossing a railroad track in the city of Lancaster.
In the action by the parents for its death, it was shown
that safety gates were erected shortly after the accident.
Affirming the judgment for the plaintiff McCullom J. observes "That the Company very soon after the accident
erected gates at the crossing where it (the killing of the
child) occurred, was a fact for the consideration of the jury."
In Dark v. Railway, 164 Pa. 243, an action for the death
of Plaintiff's wife, in crossing a track, a non-suit was entered because the evidence showed negligence on the part of
the deceased. The judgment was affirmed.
The court
rejected evidence that the defendant had, after the accident,
employed a night watchman at the crossing. The Supreme
Court thought the evidence irrelevant, "because the deceased
was not killed at night but in the day time." Besides, the
trial court in entering a non-suit, had "necessarily assumed
negligence on the part of the defendants."
In Pittsburgh Southern Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa.
306, Paxson J. mentions the fact that "It has been ruled in
Railroad Co. v. Henderson and Railroad Co. vs. McElwee,
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and in McKee v. Bidwell, that where, after an accident; the
defendant removes the alleged cause, it ii to some extent
an admission that he was in default;" and no doubt is hinted
of the correctness of this position.
In Sweeny v. Barrett, 151 Pa. 600, a visitor to a saloon
having need to leave it by a rear door, which opened on a
lot, and ignorant of a stairway, leading into a cellar stepped
on the lot, in the dark and fell down the stairway. A little
while after the accident it was shown that the defendant
placed a gate across the entrance of the stairway, but whether it was a day or two, or a week after, the witness could
not say. The trial court struck out this evidence, because it
did not appear that the placing of the gate was done immediately, or within a short time after the accident. A compulsory non-suit was affirmed.
In Card v. Columbia Township, 191 Pa. 254, a vehicle in
which the wife of the plaintiff was, went over a bank and she
was killed. It was shown that soon after the occurrence, the
township widened the road and erected a guard-rail, in order
to reduce the risks of accident. But there is no intimation by
the Supreme Court, that the evidence was inadmissible. A
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, because the omission
to place a guard-rail, etc., whethter negligent or not, was
not the proximate cause of the accident, but not because it
was error to admit the proof of the subsequent placing of
the guard-rail.
In Hager v. Phaston Township, 200 Pa. 281, a horse
was thrown by one of its feet being caught in a hole at the
edge of a narrow bridge on a country road. The rider, Hager, was seriously injured. Was the Township negligent?
It was shown that a month after the accident the supervisor
filled a hole at the side of the bridge with stones. Fell J.
doubting whether testimony of alterations or improvements
after an accident should ever be admitted, held that the
filling of the hole was too late after the accident.
We have then had the recognition for fifty years, by a
great variey of justices of the supreme court of the value of
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evidence, after the accident of alterations in the arrangements
which have led to it, for showing that the toleration of the arrangement which existed at the time of the accident was negligent. In 1901, we have, for the first time, a suggestion that
the propriety of the evidence "is at least doubtful." This
through a dictum, expresses the attitude of the writer
of the opinion, Justice Fell. His objection to the evidence is
that "it makes evidence against a defendant who guards
against the occurrence of an accident, which before he had no
reason to anticipate, or who for the safety of others exercises
a precaution, when he is not legally bound to do." Hager
v. Wharton Township, 200 Pa. 281.
In Baran V. Reading Iron Co. 202 Pa. 274, the same Justice Fell was the writer of the opinion. An explosion of a
boiler in an iron mill had occurred, with the result that the
infant daughter of the plaintiff, in bed in an adjacent house,
was killed, by a piece of the boiler. The court tacitly recognizes the principle, that one man can carry on a business,
-for his own enrichment of course-and subject his neighbors
to all losses caused, in the prosecution of it, provided that
they are not caused by his malice or negligence. The profits of the business are his; the losses, if they fall on others,
are theirs. The father of the killed child could not recover
for its death, unless there was negligence. After the explosion, the defendant (a) gave orders that "hereafter, in all
cases where a furnace was drawn, the steam connections
should be closed and the boiler disconnected from the steam
main," and (b) in reconstructing the mill suspended the
boilers from both ends and also the middle: whereas, previously they had been supported at the ends only.
The court had to decide whether such evidence should
be admitted.
It repudiated the principle of stare decisis, saying "The
time has come when we should distinctly say that we do not
approve the rule and that the cases which may be considered
(and properly we may interject) as announcing and sustaining it, are, to that extent, overruled." Two reasons seem to
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be intimated. On principle, the evidence can not be defended. The act of repairing, or changing the structure or method of action" is not more likely to show that there was negligence before the accident, than that the occurrence of the
accident first suggested the use of methods or appliances,
not before thought of; it applies to conduct before an accident
a standard of duty determined by after acquired knowledge,
it punishes a prudent and well-meaning defendant who
guards against the recurrence of an accident, he had no
means to anticipate, or who, out of a considerate regard for
the safety of others, exercises a higher degree of care than
the law requires."
Is it not odd, to characterize the admission of evidence
of a fact, as "punishment"? The evidence tends to show
that the shock of an accident is needed to make the defendant see the need of alteration, and the jury are to say what
significance is to be assigned to that hebetude.
The other reason for rejecting the principle that improvements or changes made in consequence of an accident
are evidence of negligence in not having made them before
the accident is that though judges, in other states, are not
harmonious on the question, the "trend of decision" is
against the admission of such testimony, and, in one state,
Minnesota, the habit of permitting such evidence has been
given up. An opinion adverse to the admission of the evidence, is cited from the English reports, from the Supreme
Court of the United States, and from fifteen states. But
what have the courts of the other states done? And must
the Pennsylvania judges repudiate the doctrine recognized by
them many times, because the judges of one, two or twenty,
other states have not accepted it? Are we to count heads,
and say that that opinion is right which has the larger number of sponsors beyond Pennsylvania?
And, are we to substitute for the doctrine of stare decisis
of our own state, the doctrine of stare decisis of other states?
In Pennsylvania stand with or by the decisions of New York
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or Maryland, or Oklahoma, but not with or by those of Pennsylvania?
And is it clear that the Pennsylvania judges were in
error, when they permitted proof of the defendant's having
altered his methods, or the structure of his works, at the
suggestion of an accident resulting from the former method, or structure? It is not necessary to regard the alteration by the defendant, as an admission by him that he had
been negligent. It is enough to interpret it as an admission
that the former method or structure was not the best. It
is' plainly such an admission. Then, if the defendant was
using methods that were not the best, it would be for a
jury to say whether his doing so was the result of incompetence, or negligence.
When the defendant, in Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202
Pa. 274, after the explosion of the boiler, which had been
supported only at the ends arranged for the additional support in the middle, he plainly manifested a belief that the
risk of accident would be lessened by such support. He had
been using a method less safe than the safest. Why is his
admission that it was less than the safest, not receivable, to
show that it was less than the safest? And, if it was, why
is the jury not to be allowed to determine whether there was
negligence in not having earlier made the substitution of
the better method? When a dangerous force is being used,
omission to use practicable contrivances to avert accidents
might well be found by a jury to be negligence, and the
adoption after an accident, of such contrivances, may well
be deemed a concession that the old is less safe than the new.
We dismiss this case by emphasizing that it is a stunning violation of the principle stare decisis; a rejection of what, by
repeated decision, had been the law of Pennsylvania in deference to the law of some other. states.
In Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486, it was proposed
to ask a witness for the state, whether he had not been indicted and tried for embezzlement, for the purpose of lessening his credit with the jury. The trial court ruled out the
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question. The Supreme Court, through Paxson, J., affirming, said "The proper mode of proving a conviction, of embezzlenient, or any other crime, is the production of the record. It is the highest and best evidence." In Commonwealth v. Racco, 225 Pa. 133, Racco was indicted for murder.
He became a witness for himself, and, on cross-examination
was asked whether he had not been convicted and sentenced
for larceny, assault and battery, wounding and obtaining
money under false pretenses. To all these questions he
answered no. He was allowed to be contradicted by proof
of a confession to a detective that Racco had committed
these crimes. Approving of the admission of this evidence,
although proof of a crime was attempted otherwise than
through the record of conviction, Brown J., referring to
Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486, said "We do not now
approve what was there said, and, if this is to be regarded
as an expression of the law, it is overruled. **** When the
matter about which a witness is asked, though one of record,
is merely collateral to the main issue, and arises in it only
as affecting the credibility of the witness, he may testify to
it, especially when, of all others, he knows the exact truth,
without regard to the record." Between these decisions, was
an interval of twenty-five years. The "we" of 1909 did not
think as had the "we" of 1884; and said so, untrammeled by
the maxim of stare decisis.
But, perhaps the most striking display of irreverence of
a court for the decision of its predecessorss, is given in the
Sanderson v. Coal Company case. It was heard and decided
in 86 Pa. 401, the court holding that for corrupting the water
of a creek so as to make it of no further service to Mrs. Sanderson, and so as to reduce the value of her land, the Coal
Company was liable. A later trial resulted in two appeals,
one by Mrs. Sanderson because she thought the damages she
was permitted to recover, were too restricted, and the other
by the Coal Company to induce the court to retract its earlier
decision, and to determine that Mrs. Sanderson was not en-'
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titled to damages. The court reaffirmed that she was entitled to damages; two judges, Paxon, J., and Sterrett J., dissenting. Meantime the personnel of the court was changed
by the entrance into it of Justice Green and Justice Clark.
The Coal Company, suspecting that a majority of the court
might change its decision with regard to liability, sued out
a writ of error; Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Sanderson and
wife, 113 Pa. 126. Four of the Justices reversed the decision
of the trial court, and three decisions of the Supreme Court.
Mercur, C. J., Gordon, J., and Trunkey, J., dissenting. In 8
years, the court uttered three judgments in favor of the plaintiff, and then reversed them in a judgment in favor of the
defendant. The parties were the same, the cause was the
same. What differed was the two new judges, and the two
whom they superseded. After this flagrant repudiation of
the principle of stare decisis, it is difficult to believe that
the writer of an opinion is serious, when, proposing to deliver
a judgment the propriety of which he professes to doubt,
he finds excuse in the doctrine of stare decisis and refers
discontented critics to the legislature as the only instrument
competent to give redress.
As to the distinction between stare decisis and res
judicatoa, see Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Water Supply
Company, 267 Pa. 29.
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MOOT COURT
HAMMOND VS. GAS COMPANY
Declarations of a Paity-Res Gestae-Workman's Compensation Act
-- Jurisdiction of Common Pl'eas-"Course of
Employment"-279 Pa. 5 Criticised.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hammond, employee of the defendant, visited the home of a
customer of the company for the purpose of inspecting the gas
meter. On coming up from the cellar, he said to the resident of
the house that he had slipped on the stairs and had seriously hurt
himself. He was pale and gave evidence of suffering great pain.
Six hours later he returned to his home and made the same statement. An illness followed resultinZ in his death. The physician
attributes the death to the injury caused by the fall. The Workman's Comi~ensation Board refused to be convinced by this evidence
that he had suffered an accident In the course of his employment.
This is an appeal to the Common Pleas.
Baratta. for Plaintiff.
Barnis, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Barna, J. The first question that we must decide is whether the
deceased was injured In the course of his employment. Section 301
of Article 3 of the Workman's Compensation Act of 1915 contains
the following statement-"The term, injury by accident in the course
of his employment, as used in this artlcle-shall include all other
injuries while the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance
of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere." The case at bar falls within the very
letter of the statute and Hammond was injured in the course of his
employment. The criterion Is not as the attorney for the defendant
alleges, whether the defendant owned, managed, or controlled the
premises, but whether the party was Injured while engaged in the
course of his employment. If it were otherwise a salesman or a
plumber would never be entitled to compensation.
Messer vs. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. 263 Pa. 5.
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The second question is whether the Common Pleas has jurisdiction in this case. Section 409 of the Act of 1915 provides that-"the
compensation board's finding of fact shall in all cases be final--and
from any decision of the board on a question of law an appeal
may be taken to the courts." Since the appeal in this case is con-.
cerning the admission of evidence, it is a question of law and the
Common Pleas Court has Jurisdiction.
McCauley vs. Imperial W.

Co. 261 Pa. 312.

There are two declarations which the plaintiff submitted in evidence and which the board refused to receive in the consideration
of the case. The third question is whether these declarations should
have been admitted. The declarations are-the statement made by
the deceased to the resident of the house and the statement that he
made when he came home.
The statement made to the resident of the house is part of the
res gestae and, as such, it was admissable in evidence. It was a
spontaneous declaration. In the case of Guyer vs. Equitable Gas
Co. 179 Pa. 5, Guyer was a gas meter reader, and while reading a
meter entered the home of Mrs. Sillman, looking very pale and
saying that he had just slipped and hurt himself, pointing to his
back. That night he said the same thing to his wife and on the next
day to the doctor. It was held that the declaration was apparently
spontaneous and so connected with the accident as to be part of the
res gestae and, as such, competent evidence. The court in order to
be more specific as to the length of time that might intervene between the accident and the declarations, said in part--"Statements
made by a person on going downstairs as to that which just occurred
upstairs, or on entering a house as to that which had just occurred
outside, would be part of the res gestae. In either case the declaration would be an undesigned incident of the occurrence and, not the
recital of a past event." However we do not think that the time between the accident and the declaration need be of so short duration
for it was held in Smith vs. Stoner, 243 Pa. that such a declaration
was admissable even tho it was made a half hour after the accident.
File vs.

City of Lancaster, 17 Dis.

144.

Tomczak vs. Susquehanna Coal Co. 250 Pa. 325.
Van Emon vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 201 Pa. 537.
In

Riley vs. Carnegie Steel Co. 216 Pa. 82. it was held that to be

admissable as part of the res gestae, a declaration must be a spontaneous utterance accompanying or immediately succeeding or preceding the act in question; so near in point of time and place as to
be in reality a part of it, and not the designed statements of the actors nor the recital of a past event.
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Eby vs. The Travelers Ins. Co. 258. Pa. 525.
Greenleaf on Evidence, Page 264.
It is not essential to the admispability of a statement or act as
part of the res gestae that it should have been made or done at the
place where the principle fact occurred.
22 C. J. 458.
The declaration which he made when he came home is inadmissable in evidence as it is too remote in length of time, for by that
time he could have thought over the matter and coined a story to
suit himself. In McCauley vs. Imperial W. Co. supra, the deceased
told his son, after he left the factory at night, that he had been
scratched by a sticker, and when he came home, he made the same
statement to his wife. It was held that such evidence was hearsay
and not admissable.
Riley vs. Carnegie Steel Co.

Supra.
Supra.

Guyer vs. EQuitable Gas Co.

Carroll vs. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 218 N. Y. 435.
The testimony of the doctor concerning the cause of the death
was admissable. The doctor could not testify to anything that the
deceased had said concerning the cause of the injury. Medical testiinony has been used to determine the cause of death after an injury in each of the following cases:
Watson vs.

Lehigh Coal & N.

Co., 275 Pa.

251.

Whittle vs Nat. Aniline & Chemical Co. 266 Pa. 356.
Clark vs. L. V. Co. 264 Pa. 529.
Guyer vs. EQuitable Gas Co.

Supra.

Eby vs. The Travelers Ins. Co.

Supra.

The foregoing discussion brings us to the final Question whether
there was sufficient competent evidence to warrant the Board in
deciding for the plaintiff.
Section 422 of Article 4, of the act of June 26, 1919 P. L. 663 provides, "Neither the board nor any referee shall be bound by the
technical rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based only upon competent evidence."
We have arrived at the conclusion that the testimony of the
woman and the doctor were sufficient to prove an accident and that
Even technical rules would permit
death was due to this accident.
this evidence to be used. The probable nature of an accident followed by death could be established by circumstantial evidence alone.
Weinschenk vs. Phila. H. M. H. Co. 258 Pa. 98.
Judgment of the Workman's Compensation Board is reversed.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The clear opinion of the learned court below makes protracted
discussion by us unnecessary.
We do not appreciate the statement, so often made, that the
declaration about an accident is so connected with it as to be part
of it. The history of an occurence is different from it, whether the
history follows a moment afterwards or a week or month or year
afterwards.
They axe two totally different events-an 'act or state
exterior to the mind, a reaction of the mind to that state, and an
expression of that reaction In words or other signs. The statement is
unsatisfactory that the declaration was spontaneous and so connected with the accident Itself as to be part of the res gestae, and, as
such, competent evidence; 279 Pa. 5. It is enough that the declaration was manifestly spontaneous, made under circumstances which
forbad the suspicion of invention.
That Is enough to justify the
reception of it as evidence of the fact declared without thinking
that it was a part of that fact, as it palpably was not.
We affirm the judgment of the learned court below.

MORRISON VS. X COMPANY
Contracts-Corporations--Consideration-Setoff

by Corporation

vs.

Director.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Morrison, a stockholder in the X Co. and a director agreed with
the four other directors, a deficit of $5000 appearing by the report of
the book-keeper, to contribute his share of that amount, the amount
being apportioned among the five directors according to the amount
of stock held by them. Morrison's share was $1200. Two of the
other directors have paid their share of $750 and $1000.
Morrison
is sueing for his salary of $2500. The X Co. claims the right to
set off $1200 against the $2500.
Cherchesky. for Plintiff.
Einhorn. for Defendant.
Abrahams, J. There are two questions which must be considered In reaching a decision In this case. The first of these Is: was the
agreement which Morrison made with the other directors a valid, enforcable contract, and the second, if it was a good contract may the
amount of the obligation of Morrison be set off by the defendant
company against his claim for salary?
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In our opinion the contract was a valid one. The consideration
for this contract was the promise of each of the directors, and the
payment of their shares as made by two of them.
In Russel vs. Patterson, 48 Sup. 571, the facts were very similar
to those in the case at issue. Four directors of a corporation agreed
at their meeting to make up an impPirment of the capital of the
company according to their respective holdings of stock. One of
the directors paid his share. When one of the other directors sued
the company for his salary it was held that the consideration was
the payment of the obligation by one of the directors and the promises of the other two. In this case a set-off was allowed the defendant company for reasons which will be given below.
If, after the plaintiff had induced the other directors to pay
In a large sum of money on the strength of the agreement that each
would contribute his share, the defendant were allowed to ignore
the agreement, it would be a fraud upon the other stockholders
since he had received the benefit of the promises of the other directors. 96 Pa. 443, 226 Pa. 420.
Under the circumstances, therefore, we conclude that the contract
was a valid one, and the defendant is bound in obligation to each of
the directors.
As to the question, whether the company may set-off the claim
of the directors against the claim of the defendant, we believe the
answer to be In the affirmative.
The five directors present constituted the beard of directors of
the company. His promise made to the company's rbpresentatives
was made to the company as well as to them as individuals. 4S
Superior 571.
The promises were all made for the benefit of the company and
therefore the company may sue on them- 37 Pa. 210; 3a Pa. 114; 18
Sup. 96.
In our opinion therefore, the company may set off the claim for
$1200 ag-ainst Morrison's suit for $2500.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The agreement was made to repair the losses of the corporation.
Each agreed to contribute.
Some have carried
out
their agreement.
In so doing, they have furnished a consideration
for the contract of others, even If the contractual assumption by
each were not a sufficient consideration for that of the rest.
The corporation Is the mere agent of the stockholders.
The
learned court below has found an analogy between the contract
among the stockholders, for the benefit of the corporation, and the
contract among contemplating stockholders in a nascent but as yet
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unborn corporation.
The corporation, when it comes into existence, may sue on the subscription contract, made, not with it, but
with the other subscribers. Jeannette Bottle Works v. Schall, 13
Super. 96.
There are cases which hold that, when A contracts
with B. for an act beneficial to C, C, though not a party to the
contract may sue B to compel performance.
Here, the corporation
has only an oral existence.
What
is called its property, its rights, are the property, the rights of
those actual human beings, who, for the time, are ligated together.
We think the corporation is so far identical with the stockholders, for the time being, that it may enforce a contract made by
them, for its benefit.
The learned court below has discovered a
case much like the present,
Russell v.
Patterson, 43 Super.
871.
We think it gives sufficient ground for the decision made
by the court.
The judgment is affirmed.

SIMPSON VS. HOLLANDER
Evidence-Proof

of

Foreign

Laws--Presumption

in

Absence

of

Proof-Non-Reversible Error-81
Sup. 195 followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hollander allowed a truck to stand on a highway of Delaware at
10 o'clock at night without lights. The law of that state required
lizhts under such conditions. Simpson's automobile, in consequence,
collided with it and was injured to the extent of $1000. This is an
action for damages brought in Pa. The court refused proof of the
Delaware law, unless by an attorney from that State, declined to
receive a printed copy of the laws, and certain decisions of the State
of Delaware, and ruled that the law of Delaware will be presuiied to
be likA that of Pennsylvania.
The appellate court compared the
Delaware statutes with the statutes of Pennsylvania, and found
the requirements of the former more exacting as to lights and the
period of night than that the Pennsylvania statutes. Verdict for
the plaintiff.
Anpeal.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bertman, J.
The controversy in this case evolves about the questions--(1) how may the laws of a foreign state be proved and (2)
whether it is reversible error on the part of the court below in refusing to admit copies of the law of Delaware?

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The counsel for the plaintiff rightfully contends that since the
cause of action arose in Delaware the rights of the parties concerned are to be controlled by the laws of that state, which in absence
of proof to the contrary are presumed to be like those of this state
and so held In Bollinger vs. Gallagher 170 Pa. 84, Musser vs. Stauffer
192 Pa. 392.
As proof of negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff
correctly cited the case of Jaras vs. Whight 263 Pa. 486. in which
case the Court held that there is no legal excuse for the failure to
obey an absolute statutory requirement.
In Bayuk Bros. vs. Wilson Martin Co. 81 Superior 195, the
Court held that the burden is upon the defendant to show that the
laws of the state in which the cause of action arose are different
frofn those in the state where the action is brought.
The case of Bayuk Bros. vs. Wilson Martin Co., supra, is in all
respects analogous to the case at bar. In that case the lower court
refused to admit copies of the laws of New Jersey, which required
cars to be lighted at an earlier hour than the Pa. law, and the defendant failed to introduce proof that the laws of Pa. and New Jersey were different.
The upper court in reviewing the decision of
the lower court held-"Judgments are not to be reversed because
the court has made a mistake of law; the errors which are fatal to
the judgment are such only as may reasonably be held to have worked Injury to the cause of the other party."
We agree with the learned counsel for the defendant In much
of his criticism of the lower court's holding. The offer to Introduce the copies of the statutes of the state of Delaware was refused.
the learned court being of the opinion that the only method of proving the laws of another state was by calling an attorney of that
jurisdiction to testify as to what the law was. We agree with the
learned counsel that the court committed error in refusing to admit
the copies of the law of Delaware into evidence, but, did the court's
refusal constitute such error as will warrant a reversal? We are of
the opinion that it does not In the case at bar. In deciding this
point we must consider whether or not the party seeking to have
the evidence Introduced was Injured by the lower court's refusal to
admit it.
The defendant in the present case had violated the law of Penna,
and the laws of Delaware are more burdensome In this respect than
those of this state. We, therefore, can conceive of no good reason
why the defendant should complain because the lower court refused
to admit the copies of the Delaware Laws Into evidence. If the
complaint of the defendant were to be upheld, he, the defendant.
would be subjected to a greater difficulty In establishing his de-
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fence.
The mistake, Instead of constituting an injury to his cause,
has on the contrary inured to his benefit.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that atho the -court below
erred in not allowing the printed copies to be Introduced, yet since
the refusal inured to his, defendant's, benefit, and in consideration
of the above mentioned authorities, no reversible error was committed, the appeal must be dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.

TEMPLE VS. HOPEWELL AND SCHWARTZ
Partnership-Liability

of Firm for Act

of One Partner--Uniform

Partnership Act; Sec. 13, 275 Pa- 246 and 277
Pa. 98 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants owned an automobile which was used in their business, but, occasionally, on errands not pertaining thereto. Hopewell
was using it to reach his home in the evening but he hurried from
his direct course to visit a friend, a member of the Rotary Club,
to consult for a few minutes about an Impending club affair. While
doing so he ran against Temple and severely Injured him. Temple
sues the partnership, asking $500 damages.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Devers, J.

It is essential to a recovery in this case that it ap-

pear that the accident from which the plaintiff's injury resulted
occurred while the partner was using their automobile in the course
of partnership business. To show this, the counsel for the plaintiff
ingeniously offers evidence that when Hopewell went to see his friend
at the Rotary Club it was concerning business In which his partner
was likewise interested. If such could be reasonably inferred from
the facts, the court would have no recourse but to decide for the
plaintiff as the law is well settled "That the partnership Is liable for
the wrongful acts or omissions of a partner while he is acting in the
ordinary course of the firm's business or with his co-partner's authority."
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Zondler et al. v. Foster Mig. and Supply Co., 277 Pa. 98.
Polls v. Helzmann et al. 276 Pa. 315
Curran v.

Lorch, 243 Pa. 247.

30 Cyc. 523 Sec. 13, Uniform Partnership Act-1915 P. L. 18-21.
However, in the case at bar It appears that Hopewell, his day's
business being finished, was on his way home.

While so doing, he

turned from his course and went to a certain Rotary Club to discuss
with one of Its members, a coming club affair.

All of which tends

to show that when Hopewell was on his way to the club he was
acting in the capacity of an individual and not as an agent of the
partnership.
It is an established fact that a partner Is to be considered the
agent of the partnership, and the liability of the partnership is that
of a principal for the acts of his agent, but only within the scope
of his authority. Recognizing these principles, the plaintiff's counsel
suggests that since the car was occasionally used on errands not
pertaining to the partnership business there was implied authority
that on using the car on his way home, he was In the course of
partnership business, and the fact that he turned from such course
would in no way tend to lessen the partnership's liability. To substantiate this proposition numerous Pennsylvania cases are cited.
Upon review of these cases it develops that in all there was
either expressed or implied authority from the other partner to do
such acts and It was therefore in the course of their business. These
cases differ from the one at bar In that here no authority seems to
have been given either expressly or impliedly by the other partner.
In the case of Lotz vs. Hanlon, 217 *Pa. 339, a case similar to
the one at bar. it was held that one must not only show that the car
was used as a partnership car, but that at the time of the accident
it was being used in partnership business. Here It appears that
the use of the machine by the partner on the trip to the club was
merely incidental to his trip home and made merely for his own convenience and pleasure and unauthorized by his partner and not in
the scope of their business. Under such circumstances the partnership would not be liable. Lindley on Partnership. 2nd. Am. Ed. P.
150 says "If a partner commits a tort, not as a partner, but as an
individual In respect to a matter entirely foreign to the business,
the other partner Is not liable unless he either authorized or adopted the wrongful act.
Therefore, In view of the above facts and the well settled rules
of law, we find for the defendants and a non-suit Is allowed.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME

COURT

The automobile belonged to the defendants jointly. It does not
follow from this fact that the injury inflicted by it is to be attributed to them. They might have lent it to X, whose operation, for
his own purpose, could not be Imputed to them.
The automobile belonged to the two partners. However. it
might be operated by one of them. If it was operated for the two
the negligence of the one operating it will be attributed to the two.
If it was operated by one, for his, not the firm's, business, the negligence could not be imputed to the other partner or to the firm.
Hopewell was using it to reach his home In the evening. We
cannot say that in going home he was acting for the firm. As well
might it be said that In eating, in sleeping, in awakening the following morning, in dressing with a view to the resumption of his labors, in eating breakfast, he was acting for the firm.
He was on his way to a friend's home when the accident happened. With the friend be wished to discuss, not a theme in which
the partnership was interested, but one in which he, as an individnal, and the friend alone were interested, viz an affair of the, Rotary
Club. How can it be said that he was operating the automobile in
the business of, or for, the firm? It plainly cannot. The decision
Cf. Treon vs.
of the learned court below must then be affirmed.
Shipman and Son, 275 Pa. 246, Zondler vs. Supply Co., 277 Pa. 98.

JOHN FRANKLIN VS. HENRY FRANKIN
Wills-Valid Conditions Subsequent-Constitutional Provisions
Concerning Reigion-275 Pa 266 Differentiated174 Pa. 642 Approved.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
John Franklin devised by will a farm to his son Henry and his
heirs, so long as he should remain a member of the X church. This
church was one of the larger denominations. The will urovided
that, on Henry's ceasing to be a member, the land should pass over
to a younger brother John and his heirs. Five years after Franklin's death, Henry left the X church, but did not give up the farm
Action of ejectment by John.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Golden.

J.

The

question

for

determination

Is

whether

the

limitation imposed by the will upon the devisee is valid. The limitation prescribed by the will is, "as long as he should remain a mem-
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ber of X church." In examining this limitation, we are confronted
by the question: does the limitation constrain the devisee from his
freedom of worship? We are of the opinion that it does.
It is enacted in Art. I. Sec. III of the Pennsylvania Constitution
that, "all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and
no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent.
No human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere
with rights of conscience, and no preference shall be given by law
to any religious establishment, or modes of worship."
The right of the citizens of the Commonwealth to worship God
in accordance with the dictates of their own consciences is a landmark of the old colony. It was, In fact, one of the chief reasons
for Its establishment. Art. I, Sec III. of the Pennsylvania Constitution was re-enacted from the Duke of York's Laws Page 107.
The testator's will violates this State policy. He wished to force
his son, the devisee, to adhere to a certain religious faith under
If
penalty of the loss of what might be termed his Inheritance.
we were to hold the limitation valid, we would not only contravene this announced policy but we would originate a method
whereby, through successive encroachments, the worship of God ac.
cording to a given religious persuasion could be controlled and compelled through the disposition of property at death. It would be a
step backward to the days of religious persecution.
The same question arose In 275 Pa. 266. The Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Kephart, held that the limitation was invalid.
This decision is consonant with the Constitution of Pennsylvania
and the policy of the State.
We therefore are of the opinion that the limitation Is Invalid
and that the devisee took an absolute estate In fee. We dismiss the
action of ejectment and order judgment to be entered for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The testator Intended that, at his death, Henry should have a
fee in his farm if he was a member of the X church, and that, on
the cessation at any time of this membership, the farm should cease
to be Henry's and become his brother John's.
There Is not, here, a failure to
on Henry's abdication, as in Droce
The only question Is whether
condition subsequent, and another

name a person to take the farm
v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266.
making one estate to end, by a
estate to begin, by a condition

5+
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precedent. (the same event), is unenforcable because of the nature of
the event which constitutes the condition.
Some conditions
Henry's estate was
continue to own the
formed, as to be an

subsequent are void e. g. if the continuance of
made dependent on his murdering M. he would
estate tho he did not murder M. A condition, so
inducement to a crime would be ignored.

Is there any adequate reason for the refusal to respect the condition in this casei
It Is not reprehensible for a man to love a particular church
and to be anxious that his son shall be members of It; nor to
offer an Inducement by gift, if he Is a member, which gift is to cease
if he ceases to be such. There are many pious but possibly foolish
men who are deeply devoted to a particular cult. The agents of the
law do not exist to rebuke this foolishness nor to prevent the foolish
man from using his estate as a means of promoting the particular
church, or, as he conceives it, the spiritual welfare of his beneficiary, particularly if his own son.
A man has a right to belong to any church or to no church,
to worship or not to worship God, as against the State. The constitution puts a limit on the power of the state to penalize irreligion
or desertion of one church for another. It is singular that it should
be supposed to prohibit a man's giving his land to another, If that
other should be, at the time of the gift a member of a particular
church and to make the continuance of the gift depend on the continuance of the membership.
It is a commonplace in constitutional law of this state, that
when the constitution says that men may worship God according to
the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can be compelled
to attend or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, against his consent; it means that the state cannot compel him. How foolish to cite it as preventing a testator from conditioning a gift on membership of a particular church. The testator
could bequeath or devise his estate away from his children without
condition. Why can he not specify a condition? The legatee is not
bound to comply. He may do so or not as he will. To denbunce
such a condition as unenforceable is to say that A cannot, by gift
or bribe, induce D to do a particular act and that B can retain the
gift without doing that act. We have moved far In the direction of
disparaging religious sentiment, but hardly so far as that.
It is hardly necessary to say that the Constitution of the United
States prevents Congress from passing any law establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise of it. It does not affect state
or individual action.
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The attempt to deduce from the inability of state or nation to
establish or favor a particular church the inability of the individual
to do so, is puzzling.
We have intimated that Droce vs. Klinedinst differs from this
case in its facts. We do not refuse submission to it. We cannot
derive from it the doctrine that making membership in a church a
condition subsequent or precedent to an estate is not permissible.
In White's estate vs. Appeal of Free Library, 174 Pa. 642. a
testator made bequests to certain charitable corporations but provided that, if at any time, any such corporation should give any
support, aid, sympathy, or countenance to the pernicious doctrine of
prohibition, the legacy should become void and the money, (which
had been held in trust for such legacy,) should be used in the establishment of a free library in Philadelphia.
The corporation legatees renounced the legacy so it was unnecessary to decide whether the condition subsequent was valid. Justice
Dean however, remarks, (and his good sense may be commended)
"whatever criticism may be passed upon the peculiar views of the
testator, we can only say that his money was his own, to do with
it as he pleased; if he chose not to give it to those who would proIt is our
mulgate a doctrine which he hated, that is his business.
business however, to give effect to the wills of dead men, whenever they are not contrary to law, irrespective of our views as to
the wisdom of their benefactions."
This is a wholesome view of the functions of a court. The
court should be chary of assuming legislative functions; as in saying
that a man who believes in a particular church shall not in his
will, give a motive to his son to continue in the church by conditioning his devise upon such continuance.
The judgment of the learned court below must be reversed.

TROLLOPE VS. RAILWAY COMPANY
Evidence-Negligence-Reputation
vious Negligent

for Negligence-Evidence

of Pre-

Acts--"Elevator Case."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A collision
Trollope was a motorman of defendant company.
between his car and another caused by the negligence of X, motorman of that car, killed Trollope. X had been originally careful but
in the course of his ten years of employment, had grown reckless.
The plaintiff offers to prove this by showing five cases during the
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last year In which X had caused his car to collide with others and
by his reputation among defendant's employees for negligence. No
evidence has been given of defendant's knowledge of the previous
collisions or of the reputation. Lower court found for the plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Mutzabaugh, J. In the case at bar, in order that the plaintiff
might recover against this defendant. he was bound to show by
affirmative testimony, first, that X was an incompetent servant for
the duty he had to perform; and, second, that the fact of his Incompetency was known to the defendant.
In the case of Rosenstiel vs. Pittsburgh Rys Co. 230 Pa. 273,
it was held that incompetency of a fellow employee must be established by evidence of general reputation and cannot be proved by
specific acts. The plaintiff in this case offers to prove the incompetence of X by showing, first, five cases within the past year In
which the car of X had collided with other cars and, second, the reputation of X among defendant's employees. According to the case
above cited, evidence of previous collisions would not be admissible
to establish the incompetence of X. so the first offer must be rejected. However. in support of his contention, we have further his
offer of evidence as to the reputation of X among defendant's employees. This evidence Is admissible, although the alleged incompetency arose after the lawful employment of X, and although the evidence does not tend to establish a bad reputation for the precise
kind of negligence which caused the injury in question., It is not
necessary to prove that the person whose Incompetency is at issue
had a bad general reputation for the precise character of negligence
which caused the injury. Proof of habitual recklessness and carelessness in the work he Is employed to do is sufficient.
Although there was no evidence given in this case of defendant's
knowledge of the previous collisions, or of the reputation of X, this
fact does not screen the defendant company from liability. We are
of the opinion that the reputation for incompetency of X was sufficient notice to the defendant. In the case of Driscoll vs. Fall River
3) Northwestern 1003, it was held that "a general reputation regarding the incompetency of a servant is admissible on the ground that
it furnishes some reason to believe that If the master had exercised
due care, he might have learned or heard of the incompetency.
In view of the authorities above cited, we are of the opinion that
the plaintiff Is entitled to recover. The judgment of the lower
court is affirmed.
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6PtNION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Skill and care are
Was the motorman unskillful or negligent?
shown only in acts or the effects of acts. In the year preceding
the occurrence, in which Trollope lost his life, the motorman had
caused five collisions. Could more cogent evidence that he was destitute of skill or care be imagined? On such acts this reputation
People who know of the acts, sumof the motorman is based.
marize the impression made by them, by saying he is reckless, he
is unskilled. Why could a juror not draw the same inference? He
It is unscientific to hold that the opinion of X, Y, Z. etc.
could.
can be put in evidence, but not the facts which have engendered
that opinion.
It is objected that to allow such proof would expose the defendant to unfair surprise. That could be averted, by requiring
the plaintiff to specify in advance of the trial, the facts on which
he could relv.
As to the multiplication of issues, that objection rests on a
distrust of the mental power of the juror.
Many are the cases
in which he has to decide as many issues as he would have to deare
cide, were the five collisions held provable. If the jurors
mentally too feeble to be able to sift a number of facts from the
evidence, the state should adopt a better standard of capacity for
Jury service.
The courts of this state however, insist on the exclusion of
the primary evidence of negligence and incompetence, viz., the
acts or omissions that express it, and permit the secondary evidence
of it, viz., the impressions made on people who have knowledge of
these acts or omissions; that is, the reputation.
To charge the defendant, not only must the motorman have
been often negligent or incapable, but it must, through its appropriate officer, have had knowledge of such character of the motorman.
This knowledge is provable by circumstances, and the inference is legitimate from five collisions, that the defendant had
knowledge of them.
Such serious mishaps are not hidden under a
bushel.
1 Wigmore, Evid. Sec. 250, p. 320.
The Pennsylvania authorities however, exclude particular acts
to establish the employee's general negligence or want of skill, and
also to establish the employer's knowledge of such acts.
Was the reputation of the motorman properly received?
It
was not a general reputation, but a reputation among the defendants' employees.
They are interested in each other; in the affairs
of the employer. Among whom would an employee's characteristics
be so apt to be observed and discussed?
If the reputation is admissible as evidence of the general unfitness of the motorman, that
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which pervades the community of fellow-servants should be. Again,
if the existence of a reputation is to be deemed evidence that the
company had knowledge of it, Rosenstiel v. Pittsburg Rys. Co.,
230 Pa. 273, 284, a reputation among no other class would be as
apt to reach the authorities of the corvoration.
With regret that the very cogent evidence of unfitness, that
of the five collisions is under the decisions of this state, not receivable, we must affirm the judgment of the learned court below.
Affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH
Murder-Plea

VS. HARRISON

of SeIf-defense-Admissability
ceased-277

of Reputation

of De-

Pa. 122 Followed

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Murder. The affair was between Harrison and the person killed,
Bates, no other being present. Harrison testified to a violent and
brutal attack from Bates, which made resort to the fatal shooting
necessary in self defense. The Commonwealth offered evidence that
Bates had the reputation of being a quiet, indolent, good natured
man, peaceable always. Harrison objects to this evidence.
Verdict-guilty of murder in the first degree.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Trembath, J. The law on these facts is that as a rule evidence
as to the reputed character of a person is not admissible, quite regardless of the fact that it may be relevant, and may have a probative value. It is inadmissible according to Greenleaf for two reasons: first, it tends to confuse the issue, and second, It Is likely to
excite undue predjudice in the minds of the jurors which would lead
them to a verdict regardless of the other evidence.
However in homicide cases there is another reason why the Commonwealth may not introduce evidence as to the reputed good character of the deceased. The reason is because until the deceased's reputation Is put in issue by the defendant it is presumed to be good.
In these same cases the defendant may introduce evidence as to the
bad character of the deceased to rebut the presumption aforementioned, where such a rebuttal would tend to establish likelihood of an
aggression on the part of the deceased, and also if It first be shown
that the defendant knew of such bad reputation, to show a reasonable belief that an attack was being made by the deceased.
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Where the. defendant has made self defense his plea courts will
allow evidence of the reputed character of the deceased to be admitted as evidence of the fact whether the deceased was or was not.
as alleged, the aggressor. "Most of the courts admitting it for this
purpose prescribe as a condition that there shall be some independent evidence of the deceased's aggression, or, in the phrases of some,
an overt act of aggression by the deceased." 1 Wigmore 40 and cases
there cited. That such evidence is admissible for such purpose in
Pa. see Commonwealth vs. Castellano 277 Pa. 122. That case does
not, however, seem to decide that such evidence of self defense will
alone and in and of itself pave the way for the admission of such
evidence.
In that case the facts of the case were similar to this one but the
evidence was not, for in addition to the plea of self defense and the
evidence supporting that plea there was also evidence introduced by
the defendant as to the bad reputation of the deceased for peaceful
and quiet disposition. And even this case was never before presented in this state according to Chief Justice Von Moschizsker, but he
does not commit himself on the question before this court although
he does discuss it to some extent.
Taking it as established In Pennsylvania then that evidence of
the reputation of the deceased as to a disposition to peace and quiet
Is admissible on the question of whether the deceased was or was
not the aggressor, we have only to discuss the question of when that
evidence becomes admissible.
It Is also a rule of evidence that the defendant may in & criminal
proceeding set up his own good reputation in respect to the crime
charged, as reflecting his true character, and that as consequence
it would be unreasonable to suppose that he would commit an act
diametrically opposed to the character so reflected. The mere
charge of a crime against him will permit the admission of such evidence. When the defendant sets up the plea of self defense he becomes the accuser and the deceased the acccused and the Commonwealth should then be allowed to answer the attack on the character
of the deceased because they are the only ones who may protect It.
We fall to see how It can be argued logically that although the deceased and the accused start out in the trial with their character's
presumed to be good, that In the case of one a criminal charge will
pave the way for evidence as to the good reputation of the one In
rebuttal of the crime charged, while the other who is likewise charged with a crime is not allowed to rebut that charge with like evidence. If there is a difference in the cases, what or where is it? As
stated above both are accused of a crime. Is the difference then In
the fact that the truth of the accusation of one Is now being tried?
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That is true for both, for the jury if it convicts must necessarily find
that the deceased was not the aggressor, and if it acquits says at the
very best that they are In doubt whether he was or not. Is It the
fact that a penalty is awaiting the first attack and not the second?
The deceased has paid his penalty and deserved at least that any attack on his character be vindicated. Nor would such an Inquiry confuse the issue. The jury must in any event pass on the question
as to the likelihood of his having been the aggressor and the evidence as to the reputed good character of the deceased for peace and
quiet could do no harm and would help them to reach their decision.
Counsel for the defendant have given two views under which
the evidence might very well be excluded; first, that the admission
of such evidence would surprise the defendant and make him contend
an Issue that he could not be expected to meet; and second, that because one specific act does not or cannot prove reputed character,
that one specific act cannot be given as proof of an attack on character.
I cannot see the hardship of the first argument. A counsel for
the defendant could not help but see in an action of this kind where,
by the very nature of the facts the Commonwealth is restricted to
circumstantial evidence in proving the guilt of the defendant, that
the character of the parties to the fight would play an important part.
Furthermore what hardship there might be would be restricted to
this case because it would establish the rule that where the defendant pleads self defense and the evidence is purely circumstantial
evidence as to the reputed character of the deceased for peace and
quiet would be admissible. It Is far better that one defendant be
subjected to the questionable hardship of attacking the character
of the deceased than to place a premium upon chosing an unfrequented place and using stealth in the perpetration of a crime.
It is true as contended that one specific act will not prove the
reputed character of the deceased or anyone else, and that
the reputed character is what people generally believe to be the
character of the person. We would much prefer to know the real
character of anyone but since that is in its nature impossible of determination we must chose the next best proof of what it really Is,
that is what people generally think It is, as being more reliable than
what any particular person thinks it is.
It cannot be seriously argued that what people think to be the
character of a person is the best method of disproving a certain alleged reputed character. That would be one method, for if people
generally do not believe that a certain person has such and such a
some proof that such Is the case.
character it is certainly
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There is another and a better way, I think, of disapproving reputation. That is by showing that it is not deserved. One specific act or
two specific acts will do this if they be sufficiently well established.
Is it to be denied that that is the reason why so many people take
care that their actions be seemly if they have any respect at all for
for their reputation? In our opinion then the evidence was properly admitted and the conviction below is affirmed.
We have at least three sister states to confirm our stand on this
question. Thrawley vs. State 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95; State vs.
Holbrook 98 Ore. 43, 192 Pac. 640, 647 State vs. Tackett 8 N. C. 210.
In State vs. Holbrook supra the Court said: "In at least two
Jurisdictions including Oregon the plea of self defense accompanied
by evidence to support it, has been treated as a sufficient attack on
the character of the decedent for peace and quiet to entitle the State
to submit rebuttal evidence of his good reputation for peacefulness."

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Harrison has killed Bates, and Is on trial for murder.
He admits the killing, but seeks to justify it as an act of self-defence.
He alleges that Bates brutally attacked him, and made his fatal
act necessary, in order to save his own life.
Harrison is a deeply interested witness.
Bates is no longer
here to contradict him.
Whether Bates made the alleged attack.
and whether It was visibly dangerous to Harrison. is a matter to
bA inferred from circumstances.
Harrison's testimony is a circumstance, but its truth is infirmed by his personal Interest.
Can it be still further infirmed?
That a man has not done acts of a certain class may create
some likelihood that he did not do an act of that class, on a given
occasion.
If a man of 40 years, has never sought a quarrel, has
never threatened or assaulted anybody, has been uniformly quiet,
good-natured, and peaceable, and, withal is Indolent, it is unlikely that on the alleged occasion, he exhibited contradictory qualities. was fierce, aggressive, murderous.
Ordihaxily,. the habit of a man, to be quiet, law abiding, is
not provable by exhibiting situations In which he has displayed
these tendencies, not because such proof would not be convincing,
but because it would cost too much time and probably weary the
natience of the jury, or confuse it by the number of contested instances.
So, to escape this inconvenience from the proof of particular
behaviors, it is the habit to receive proof of reputation, and to infer the behavior, the pharacter, from this reputation.
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The question then Is, whether the reputation of being a quiet,
good natured, always peaceable man, is some evidence that the

deceased was quiet, good natured. etc.
Reputation for truth or untruth, is some evidence that a witReputation of being a law-abiding
ness is- truthful or otherwise.
peaceable man, is some evidence that the person having this repuWhy should it not be such evitation, Is law abiding, peaceable.
dence, when the subject of it is not the defendant but the deceased? To the accusation against a defendant, may be opposed his
reputation of being one who did not commit the kind of act of which
he is accused. Why should not the deceased when charged with a
violent and homicidal act, be shown to have a reputation which
men who do such acts are not likely to have?
The case cited by the
Further discussion Is needless.
learned court below, 277 Pa. 122, will suffice for an authority.
The well conceived opinion of the learned court below well
sustains its decision.
Affirmed.

